Not Everyone's a Robin Hood: Altruism, Envy, and the Political Demand for Redistributive Tax Policy

Abstract

Policy responses to inequality have fallen short of the redistributive reforms needed to counter rising economic disparities even in democracies where voters could demand such interventions. One explanation for this redistribution gap is that citizens do not sufficiently value tax policies that take from the rich to fund transfers to the poor. We present survey-experimental evidence from Denmark, Italy, Mexico, and the United States demonstrating that voters appreciate more progressive and poor-friendly tax reforms. We then investigate whether this sensitivity reflects two types of inequality aversion: altruism and envy. Using behavioral measures, we find that altruistic and envious individuals are more likely to endorse Robin Hood-like reforms. The low prevalence of individuals sensitive to both forms of inequality, fewer than 30 percent, restricts political demand for tax-and-transfer policies; however, we find that on need not be a Robin Hood to support tax-and-transfer policies benefiting the poor. These findings shed light on the moral foundations of redistribution preferences and why policy responses have been insufficient to offset rising inequality.

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